In the framework of a partnership with Forus in the MENA region, the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) is offering different pieces of reflection about the current context for civil society organisations in several countries of the region. The first one focused on the reality and challenges of civil society in Jordan. Discover the second one on Syria and the impact of Covid here.

After a rapid economic and social deterioration in the previous few months, and after three months of the beginning of the spread of the epidemic, there were serious fears about its potentially devastating impact. As the government publishes very limited data and information, to date, there is no proper assessment of the health, economic and social impact of the COVID-19 in Syria. However, many anecdotal pieces of evidence from Syria confirm the low levels of preparedness across the country. As the severity of the crisis started to be clear, COVID-19 came and largely destroyed what remained of Syria’s capacity to meet the pressures on its economy, on the government’s budget, on the rate of its currency, and on the population’s patience. COVID-19 seems largely exacerbating Syria’s socioeconomic collapse. Serious economic and socioeconomic risks are growing, as the economic downturn prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed hundreds of thousands of Syrian Internally Displaced People into an ever more desperate situation and has increased their humanitarian needs. The number of vulnerable families who lack the basic resources to survive has dramatically surged as a result of the lack of public services and health support.

Unsurprisingly, the economic and food insecurity has been tremendous. According to WFP, the average price of a standard reference food basket in June 2020 was SYP 84,095, increasing by 48% compared to May 2020, which outlines the serious deterioration in peoples’ purchasing power (See Syria Country Office Market Price Watch Bulletin Issue 67, June 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-office-market-price-watch-bulletin-issue-67-june-2020). Compared to the pre-COVID-19 period, the national average reference food basket price increased by 110 percent since February 2020, and the WFP’s reference food basket is now more expensive than the highest government monthly salary (SYP 80,240). This increase in the national average food basket price is caused by a multitude of factors such as: high fluctuations of the Syrian pound on the informal exchange market, intensification of unilateral coercive measures and political disagreements within the Syrian Elite.

The high volatility in the exchange market have pushed-up the prices of all commodities. Supply chains briefly entered into shock in early June as wholesalers and retailers limited sales until stability was restored to the informal exchange rate. With the hyper price inflation that impacted households’ ability to access food, all 14 governorates reported an increasing average reference food basket price in June 2020, with the highest month-on-month (m-o-m) increase reported in Quneitra (up 78 percent m-o-m), followed by Rural Damascus (up 62 percent m-o-m), and Deir-ez-Zor (up 61 percent m-o-m). While in the northeast, Idleb continued to report the highest average food basket price in Syria reaching SYP 107,891 in June 2020 (up 52 percent m-o-m), followed by Al-Hasakeh at SYP 88,619. percent m-o-m).

Socio-economic impacts of COVID-19, notably in food security and livelihoods, are likely to exacerbate more existing substantial humanitarian and lifesaving needs across the country. In spite of the wide-scale presence of western and international organizations, both in areas under and outside the control of the government, many humanitarian actors have reported that they are adapting their activities and procedures to mitigate COVID-19 related risks, and certain on-site activities (health and protection) had to be suspended to protect the affected population, as well as humanitarian workers.

All these factors are adding new levels of grievances and catastrophic consequences on the humanitarian, social, and material levels. As the Syrian communities experience several daily hardships and health risks, the majority of Syrian most fragile populations bear these consequences and stand alone, unable to confront the ravages of war, division, and the ongoing economic deterioration. Within an already political instability and volatile security context, which could worsen if people’s livelihoods are threatened further and for a prolonged period, the terrifying risks lie in the potentiality of severe malnutrition and famine in the longer-term.

In term of the populations of concern, all groups are susceptible. Syrians who have already endured almost a decade of war and displacement are now facing unprecedented levels of hunger leaving millions of people acutely vulnerable to Covid-19. However, the elderly and people with underlying health conditions are particularly at risk. As the economic situation has worsened, some humanitarian NGOs reported that the volatility of the informal exchange rate had forced temporary suspension of local procurement (OCHA and WHO, COVID-19 Update No. 14 - 10 July 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-update-no-14-10-july-2020).

Particularly in the densely populated areas, notably Damascus, Rural Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, and those living in camps and informal settlements in NES, collective shelters throughout the country, as well as other areas including Deir-Ez-Zor, their access to medical assistance and humanitarian aid will not be the same. According to the World Health Organization and OCHA, some aid deliveries have been put on hold while the new methods are sorted out: “mobile medical clinics or other services have been suspended or reduced as teams work to implement precautionary work”. And reproductive, maternal health, and GBV services are ongoing, through provision or protective equipment, establishment of additional service delivery areas, and remote counseling.

Furthermore, the rise in prices and the fall of the Syrian currency in the foreign exchange market has also generated a significant decline in business activity. While the closure of borders and crossing stopped trade and financial transactions within the areas and neighboring countries, this deceleration of economic activities is expected to put more than half a million jobs in the industrial and construction sectors at stake, as well as 650,000 jobs in hotels and restaurants. In addition, around 1.1 million self-employed persons may suffer a significant decline in their income. Moreover, governmental revenue is expected to decline significantly due to economic stagnation, with the sharp decline in the number of containers handled by the port of Latakia, which indicates a drop in foreign trade.

As the low remittances, pilgrims, and foreign visitors, particularly from Lebanon and Iran, which were two important sources of foreign currency, it is difficult to trace back where/when exactly the latest severe downward of the economy started. Thus, here, for a country in conflict like Syria, the consequences of COVID-19 and poor economic conditions are largely attributed to a multitude of factors and actors, including the Lebanese banking crisis and the consequences of the wide-scale destruction of the economy, which is difficult to attribute only to COVID-19, in particular the deterioration of specific economic and social indicators. Taking into account that the Syrian government’s revenues have been significantly hit by economic troubles in Iran, Tehran has been troubled by its own Covid-19 outbreak, crippling US sanctions, and low oil prices, as a result, and unable to keep the Syrian economy afloat.

Today, the whole of Syria is now crumbling under the weight of years-long Western sanctions, fight and death, corruption, a pandemic, and an economic downslide made worse by the financial crisis in Lebanon. And, the collapse of the Syrian pound and the displacement of millions of people will lead to an unprecedented number of families in Syria who are no longer able to put food on the table or make enough money to afford basic necessities.

Finally, since June 2020, with a rise in unemployment and in the price of consumer goods, after nearly a four month of collapsing and devastating impacts, the seriousness of COVID-19 for the Syrian economy does not only lie in its direct impact on business activity. Rather it comes from the fact that the pandemic is spreading at a time the country and communities are facing a compilation of crisis, poverty, and difficulties. In light of this, the interconnectivity of Syria’s economy and key livelihoods means that a decline in any one of the major sources of foreign currency – such as humanitarian aid, support from allies (Russia and Iran), and remittances – has a significant impact on local purchasing power, livelihoods, food security and local economy. Which, all in all, has largely destroyed the state’s institutional capacity to meet its obligations towards its citizens and alleviate the dire economic and social conditions of the population.

References:  

Gusun, Ziad. 2020. “Syrian economy after Corona” (in Arabic), AlAkhbar. April 22, 2020. https://al-akhbar.com/Syria/287463  

Abyad, Maya. 2020. “Aid Politicisation Amidst the Covid-19 Response in Northeast.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies. May 7, 2020. https://bit.ly/2XUnUSM  

Yazigi, Jihad. 2020. “COVID-19 Exacerbates Syria’s Socioeconomic Collapse”. July 10, 2020. https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/covid-19-exacerbates-syrias-socioeconomic-collapse